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Executive Summary

This report is the product of a research project carried out for the Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice. It presents information gathered on the history of climate justice and differing perspectives on and approaches to climate justice. It establishes a climate justice baseline (up to December 2011), from which the impact of the work of the Foundation can be measured.

History of Climate Justice
Climate justice has a complex history and encompasses a number of different strands of influence. These strands have shaped climate justice and contributed to its diversity. Climate justice has roots in the environmental and global justice movements of the 1980s and 1990s respectively. The term became particularly prominent with the formation of the Climate Justice Now! network in 2007. In 2009, climate change and climate justice took centre stage and there was a huge mobilisation around the COP 15 climate negotiations in Copenhagen. Viewed by some as the peak of the climate justice movement, it was a culmination of years of efforts by different individuals and groups around the world. However, pressure from climate justice activists failed to result in a legally binding climate agreement and the negotiations were seen as a failure. Many climate justice actors have since retreated from the global sphere. Countries are now focused on negotiating a climate agreement for 2015.

Perspectives on Climate Justice
Climate justice represents a complexity of groups and perspectives that are bound by a common goal for finding a just solution to the global problem of climate change. Climate justice actors come from diverse backgrounds and a range of political positions. This research project found that this diversity is reflected in differing perspectives along three lines.

i) Perspectives of those in the North often contrast with the perspectives of those in the South. The Southern narrative is very justice-oriented in comparison with the North. For people and countries of the South, climate change is strongly linked to development. Issues of equity and CBDR-RC are fundamental. The developed-developing dichotomy of perspectives is changing. It has evolved and now the emerging economies represent a different view. While perspectives and priorities may differ within and between nations, the global nature of the climate crisis requires international co-operation if it is to be tackled successfully.

ii) This research project found evidence of a disconnect between individuals and groups who see the global climate response from an ethical point of view, and those who view it in pragmatic terms. Perspectives differ on how far one should adhere to one’s principles and when these can be compromised in order to make progress politically. For
example, while some groups refuse to engage with the UNFCCC, others are willing to work within it in the absence of an alternative forum.

iii) Within the climate justice community, conflicting opinions on the role of carbon markets are evident. Some climate justice actors are proponents of market-based solutions to climate change while others criticise them as false solutions, claiming that they do not challenge the climate problem and will not succeed where climate justice is concerned.

Approaches to Climate Justice Action

The findings of this research project confirm the divisions made by Athansiou and Baer (2002 cited in Evans, 2010) of four overlapping and interconnected areas of climate justice action:

One approach to climate justice action focuses on combatting the causes of climate change. This can take different forms, from proposing emission reduction strategies to organising mass public demonstrations demanding action is taken against the roots of the problem.

Other actors focus on protecting and promoting the rights of affected communities, including particularly vulnerable groups within these communities. This approach extends to action to protect the rights of future generations, who are especially vulnerable to the decisions we make today in response to climate change.

A third approach centres on action to ensure compensation for those who carry the burdens of climate change by those who have benefited, in an attempt to address 'climate debt'. This compensation can take many forms including finance, technology, and capacity building.

A fourth approach to climate justice action involves promoting participatory democracy. This entails efforts to ensuring equal participation in climate decision making processes both inside and outside the UNFCCC, at national and international levels.

Who was using a Climate Justice Narrative up to the End of December 2011?

A review of the use of a climate justice narrative (to end of 2011) found that civil society were the main users. With regard to use by countries, Bolivia stands out as the most involved in climate justice. Other members of the ALBA group were also associated with the narrative. Within the UNFCCC COP processes, climate justice was infrequently referred to in statements made at COP 16 and COP 17. A small number of world leaders were found to use a climate justice narrative. Those that do, use their high profiles to draw attention to the cause. The research did not find evidence of use of the narrative by the private sector. An assessment of use of the narrative by the general public was beyond the scope of the project.
Acronyms

ALBA  Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas
BASIC  Brazil, South Africa, India, China
CAN  Climate Action Now
CBDR-RC  Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism
CJN!  Climate Justice Now!
COP  Conference of the Parties
EJCC  Environmental Justice and Climate Change
G77  Group of 77
GCCA  Global Call for Climate Action
ICHRP  International Council on Human Rights Policy
IET  International Emissions Trading
IPCC  Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change
JI  Joint Implementation
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
REDD  Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US  United States
YOUNGO  Youth NGOs
Introduction

This report is the product of a research project carried out for the Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice. It presents information gathered on the history of climate justice and differing perspectives on and approaches to climate justice. It establishes a climate justice baseline up to the end of December 2011, from which the impact of the work of the Foundation can be measured.

In the first section, the parameters of the study are outlined, including the rationale for the research, the methodology used and its limitations. The second section briefly addresses the injustice of climate change, describing the asymmetries of responsibility and vulnerability to the problem. A historical account of the origins and evolution of climate justice are then presented, illustrating how years of efforts by different movements and groups around the world culminated to form the concept and movement of climate justice.

The fourth section categorises differences in perspective of climate justice actors along three lines: north-south, principles v pragmatism, and on the role of carbon markets. The fifth section describes four approaches to climate justice action: addressing causes of climate change, the rights of affected communities, reparations for historic climate debt, and promoting participatory democracy. Section six reviews the use of a climate justice narrative at the end of December 2011. This includes an assessment of its use by civil society, by actors within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as evidenced at the 16th and 17th Conferences of the Parties (COP 16 and COP 17), by world leaders, by the private sector and by the general public. Finally, the baseline information is summarised.
1. Parameters of the Research Project

1.1 Purpose and Rationale
The vision of the Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice (the Foundation) is for global justice and equity to underpin a people-centred developmental approach by 2020, advancing climate justice and more effectively addressing the impacts of climate change. The Foundation has a working definition of climate justice that links it with human rights and development to achieve a human-centred approach, safeguarding the rights of the most vulnerable and sharing the burdens and benefits of climate change and its resolution equitably and fairly. This definition is informed by the Foundation’s core principles of climate justice.

This research project was carried out by the Foundation as part of its Business Plan for the period 2011 – 2014, in order to provide a history of climate justice, to investigate different perspectives and approaches to climate justice and to establish a climate justice baseline (up to the end of December 2011) to assess the use of climate justice narratives by actors in the fields of climate change, development and human rights. It is intended to repeat this research post-2015, to record any changes from the December 2011 baseline.

1.2 Methodology
The research project was undertaken over a period of 9 weeks by one researcher. Consideration was given to the need for the methodology to be reproducible to allow measurement against the baseline in future. The methodology involved a literature review, scoping interviews, semi-structured key informant interviews, and a review of COP 16 and 17 statements.

The literature review began with an initial reading list provided by the Foundation, which included texts relating to the areas of climate change, climate justice, and human rights. This review was conducted over a period of three weeks. A further reading list was provided by the Glasgow Caledonian University online repository on climate justice research. This list consisted of articles in which the term ‘climate justice’ was referenced in the title. This review was conducted over a period of one week.

Informal scoping interviews were completed with two people with experience in the area of climate justice. These interviews provided an introductory overview of the history of climate justice, its various interpretations and key actors.

Information gathered from the literature review and the scoping interviews informed the content of the semi-structured interviews. A total of 50 people with experience working directly or indirectly on climate justice were invited for interview to which 26 people agreed and participated (see appendix for lists of interviewees and interview questions). In addition, informal personal communications were conducted with three UNFCCC negotiators who wished to remain anonymous.
A period of three days was spent reviewing grey literature. This review focused on websites and publications of organisations and groups during the course of the literature review and the interviews.

Finally, a review was conducted of statements made at the 16th and 17th annual Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). A total of 183 statements made at COP 16 and 181 statements made at COP 17 were searched for use of the term 'climate justice'.

Statements prior to COP 16 were not accessible on the UNFCCC website. Statements are now systematically filed on the UNFCCC website and will be available for review when research is repeated in future.

### 1.3 Limitations

- The research project was constrained to a 9-week period. Had additional time been available, a more in-depth review of grey literature would have been possible.
- Only material in English was consulted (with the exception of the COP 16 and COP 17 statements, which were reviewed regardless of language).
- Only statements from COP 16 and COP 17 were reviewed as those from prior COPs were not accessible through the UNFCCC website.
- Attempts were made to ensure that a balance of perspectives was gathered. However, certain groups and individuals were unavailable for interview in the timeframe of the research project and this may contribute to bias in the report.
- Focusing on the period up to the end December 2011 subjects the research to possible errors as the information is dependent on memory and impressions which may have changed.
- While every effort has been made to ensure a comprehensive research methodology, it is not exhaustive and therefore possible that some elements may not be accounted for.
2. The Injustice of Climate Change

Climate change is not only an environmental problem, but one that has wide reaching social, economic and political effects. It threatens food security, water security, infrastructure, health, ecosystems, increases in vector and water borne diseases, land loss, and sea-level rise (IPCC, 2007).

Climate change is a problem infused with inequalities. While no country is immune to the impacts of climate change, certain countries and people are more vulnerable than others (Few et al., 2004). Paradoxically, it is those least responsible for the problem that are the most vulnerable to it. Climate vulnerability depends not only on the impacts of climate change on a country or community but on their ability to deal with these impacts (ibid.). Climate change amplifies pre-existing vulnerabilities which make it more difficult for people to cope (UNDP, 2007). 'The world's most vulnerable people live on the margins and climate change will push them closer to the edge' (Cameron, 2010, p.686).

Climate justice frames climate change by highlighting the injustice of the problem and the ‘asymmetric distribution of burdens and benefits associated with the warming of the earth’s climate’ (Roberts & Parks, 2007, p. 8). While a wealthy minority have caused the problem and benefitted in the process, it is those who have contributed least that are likely to feel the effects most significantly (Few et al., 2004).
3. History of Climate Justice

The history of climate justice encompasses a number of different strands and narratives which merged to form the diverse concept and movement we have today. Three main strands of influence are evident:

i) Climate justice has a clear lineage with environmental justice, a movement that emerged in the US in the 1980s. Environmental justice evolved in response to the focus of the environmental movement on purely ecological issues and its failure to address the inequitable distribution of environmental costs and benefits along lines of race, class and gender (Evans, 2010; Mueller & Bullard, 2011). Debates on environmental justice have focused largely on developed country experiences (Fisher, 2012). The movement was mainly an issue for ‘frontline communities’, usually indigenous, poor, coloured, and rural communities (Evans, 2010; Mueller & Bullard, 2011). These communities attempted to combat structural environmental racism and industrial dumping by using ‘legal structures and the language of rights’ (Building Bridges Collective, 2010, p.28). Some individuals and groups that were active in the environmental justice movement were instrumental in the formation of the climate justice movement.

ii) The global justice or alter-globalisation movement also influenced climate justice. This movement made attempts to resist ‘corporate driven neo-liberal globalisation in the 1990s’ (Long, Roberts, & Dehm, 2010, p.2). The movement has an anti-capitalist perspective, opposing international financial institutions and transnational corporations. The roots of this movement can be found in the 1994 Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico. The movement was characterised by mass demonstrations and protests (Bond, 2010). It reached a peak during the protests at the World Trade Organisation in Seattle in 1999. Over 40,000 people are said to have taken part including participants from NGOs, labour unions, faith-based organisations, student groups and anarchists. The movement is also responsible for a number of other protests which have taken place around summits of G7/8, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and World Social Forum (Mueller & Bullard, 2012). Many of the groups involved in these demonstrations and protests became very involved in the climate justice movement.

iii) The third major strand of influence comes from a radical group of environmental NGOs who broke away from the mainstream in 2007. Up to this point, the fairly moderate Climate Action Network (CAN) had represented environmental civil society views in the UNFCCC process. The group of more radical environmental NGOs broke from CAN largely because it was felt that the interests of the South were not being adequately represented in the CAN advocacy strategy and because opinions differed with regard to CAN’s pro-carbon market position (Building Bridges Collective, 2010; Bullard, 2013). Thus the Climate Justice Now! (CJN!) network was founded. Initially, it was a group of 30
Academics and governments had been debating the issues of climate justice including the moral and ethical dimensions of differentiated contributions and impacts, long before the expression itself became popular (Yamin, 2013). Van Ypersele (2013) echoed Yamin's comments, remarking that climate justice is 'a new slogan for an existing product'.

The term ‘climate justice’ is first said to have been used in academic literature by Edith Brown Weiss (1989) and in political discourse by US indigenous activist Tom Goldtooth in 1995. In 1999, CorpWatch² published a report titled ‘Greenhouse Gangsters vs. Climate Justice’. It presented climate justice as an alternative to market-based solutions to the climate crisis, what they term the ‘false solutions’³ proposed by large corporations (CorpWatch, 1999). The following year, CorpWatch organised the first Climate Justice Summit, held in parallel with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change⁴ (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties (COP) negotiations in The Hague (Karliner, 2000). Over 500 people attended this alternative summit, including representatives from vulnerable communities as well as people from international coalitions including Indigenous Environmental Network, Friends of the Earth, the World Rainforest Movement and Oilwatch International (Chawla, 2009). A large contingent of leaders from the US environmental justice movement also attended, and ran their own forum at the summit (Bullard, 2000). The Summit’s action statement proclaimed ‘We affirm that climate change is a rights issue. It affects our livelihoods, our health, our children and our natural resources. We will build alliances across states and borders to oppose climate change inducing patterns and advocate for and practice sustainable development’ (Chawla, 2009, p.120). This represented the first meeting on climate justice which transcended national boarders and political affiliations.

In 2001, the World Conference against Racism took place in Durban, South Africa. Discussions on environmental racism took place and people began to realise the global scale of the environmental problem (Bullard, 2000). The conference provided further space for the creation of international networks around environmental justice. In June 2002, a group of social and environmental organisations from North and South⁵ met in Bali and agreed on the 27 principles of climate justice (International Climate Justice Network, 2002). The Bali Principles of Climate Justice⁶ reframe climate change as a local issue. The principles prioritise carbon debt and participation of vulnerable Southern communities in the UNFCCC process. While the preamble states that ‘market-based mechanisms and technological ‘fixes’ currently being promoted by transnational corporations are false solutions and are exacerbating the problem’, principle 13 accepts that ‘climate justice affirms that any market-based or technological solution to climate change, such as carbon-trading and carbon sequestration, should be subject to principles of democratic accountability, ecological sustainability and social justice’ (International Climate Justice Network, 2002). In New Delhi a few months later, thousands of activists marched during the UNFCCC COP 8 negotiations. Farmers and fisherfolk from all over India joined delegations of indigenous people and NGOs from 20 countries. They drew up the Delhi Climate Justice Declaration affirming that ‘climate change is a rights issue – it affects our livelihoods, our health, our children and our natural resources’ (India Climate Justice...
The Declaration rejected the current market solutions and proclaimed 'Our World is Not for Sale!'. Again, environmental organisations with grassroots support were demonstrating that the commitments adopted by their governments were insufficient and unacceptable.

Since then, other climate justicedocuments and declarations have been drawn up, each proposing equitable solutions and a shift in current systems and thinking (Mickelson, 2009). For example, a conference on Environmental Justice and Climate Change (EJCC) was held in 2004 at the University of Michigan, one of the outcomes of which was a 'Climate Justice Declaration' that drew on earlier climate justice documents (Roberts and Parks, 2009). Further criticism of market solutions to the climate problem came with the formation of the Durban Group for Climate Justice in 2004. Established by a group of 'environmentalists and corporate critics' this international network provides a platform for the criticism of carbon markets and promotion of 'real not false solutions' to climate change (Bond & Dorsey, 2010, p.3; Durban Group for Climate Justice, 2004).

In 2005, the Inuit peoples of Alaska and Canada filed a petition arguing that the adverse effects of climate change, caused by the actions and inactions of the United States, had violated a number of their fundamental human rights (Watt-Cloutier et al., 2005). While the case was rejected without prejudice in 2006, a hearing was organised at which time the petitioners were invited to provide testimony on the relationship between human rights and climate change. The claims of the Inuit petition established climate change as a human rights issue. This effort came out because literature linking human rights and climate change had begun to emerge and inform activist thinking (Yamin, 2013). This interest in the use of human rights as a framework of action grew out of frustration at the lack of progress within the UNFCCC and saw a number of alternative sources of protection for people and the planet being explored including human rights (Yamin, 2013).

A key moment for the climate justice movement came in 2007 at COP 13 in Bali when the radical environmental groups broke from CAN to form CJN!. Announcing its foundation as 'a network of organisations and movements from across the globe committed to the fight for social, ecological and gender justice', CJN! publicised a set of radical demands which were later adopted as their climate justice principles (CJN!, 2009).

Throughout 2007 and 2008, climate change became increasingly recognised as a justice issue. The 2007/2008 edition of the UNDP's flagship Human Development Report focused extensively on the relationships between climate change, inequality, and justice (UNDP, 2008). This heralded the beginning of a new chapter in the climate change narrative. The fact that climate change was going to affect the day to day lives of everyone on the planet allowed the issue to take centre stage in international politics. Acceptance that the implications of climate change and its repercussions would not respect national boundaries allowed groups from all parts of the political spectrum, concerned with a myriad of aspects of climate change, to band together and call for climate justice.

The term became increasingly popular with groups forming all over the world under the banner of climate justice. For example, in 2008, with assistance from the Association of World Council of Churches and Related Development Organisations in Europe (APRODEV) the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) was formed in response to concern over the lack of participation of African
Civil Society at the UNFCCC process (PACJA, 2013). In Bangkok in September 2009, movements from across Asia joined CJN! in organising a mass rally at UN buildings. CJN! had grown to a membership of over 150 organisations and gained official recognition by the UNFCCC (CJN!, 2010).

COP 15 at Copenhagen in 2009 had been established as the deadline for reaching a post-Kyoto Protocol agreement. In advance of these negotiations, there was widespread hope and optimism that the outcome would be a fair and equitable agreement for tackling climate change (Huq, Chandani, & Anderson, 2010). The much-anticipated COP 15 saw the largest mobilisation for climate change in history with approximately 100,000 people participating in protests (Mueller and Bullard, 2011). It was a culmination of years of efforts by environmentalists, scientists, farmers, indigenous peoples, trade unions, vulnerable communities, and anti-capitalists, demonstrating together for a fair and ambitious outcome to the negotiations.

Klimaforum, the People’s Climate Summit, was held as an alternative event to COP 15. It included 202 debates, 70 exhibitions, 16 concerts, 43 films, over the period of 12 days. The phrase ‘system change not climate change’ was widely used and a ‘People’s Declaration’ calling for urgent climate action and rejecting market-oriented, technology-centred ‘false solutions’, was signed by 500 organisations (Long, Roberts & Dehm, 2010, p.3).

Participants held widely differing views on the best ways to tackle climate change and what would constitute a ‘fair’ outcome. While some groups accepted that the existing UNFCCC system was the forum in which action must be taken, others believed a radical overhaul of the current system was necessary. For example, Climate Justice Action formed in the run up to COP 15 as a network of individuals and groups taking an anti-capitalist stance and opposing the negotiations. They joined with CJN! to organise civil disobedience and direct action during the summit (Building Bridges Collective, 2010). On the other hand, the “TckTckTck” campaign considered that climate change could be addressed within the current system but appealed for ‘greener’ and ‘fairer’ policies (Mueller and Bullard, 2011). As Bullard (2013) articulated: ‘the different strands had different demands’.

Ultimately, the COP 15 negotiations did not deliver the much hoped for binding climate agreement, but rather a weak accord that failed to live up to the demands and expectations of the demonstrating interest groups. A polarity was evident between ‘inaction on the inside and huge demands for action of various sorts on the outside’ (Bullard, 2013).

Unhappy with the outcome of the UNFCCC negotiations at COP 15, President Morales of Bolivia announced an alternative COP, namely the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth (Cochabamba Conference). Held outside Cochabamba, Bolivia in April 2010, approximately 35,000 people from over 140 countries took part. The aim of the conference was to give people a voice by including civil society in a climate process independent of the UN. The outcome of the conference, ‘The Cochabamba Protocol: People’s Agreement on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth’, was submitted to the UNFCCC process. Rajamani (2010, p.403) describes it as ‘by far the most comprehensive exposition on rights to be submitted to the UNFCCC process’. Other outcomes included a separate indigenous people’s statement and a draft ‘Universal
Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth’. Some groups view the conference in Cochabamba as a significant step in the development of the climate justice movement (Long, Roberts, & Dehm, 2010). However, more radical groups disapprove of the Bolivian state involvement in the field of climate justice altogether. These opposing views evidence the underlying ideological differences of the groups in the climate justice community. (ibid.)

The climate justice movement continued to grow and mainstream groups including Greenpeace and Rainforest Action Network joined the cause in 2010 (Bond & Dorsey, 2010). Groups from all over the world were increasingly taking part in climate justice summits. For example, the Mesoamerican Climate Justice Campaign, a group representing Central American civil society took part in COP 16 as well as at the parallel alternative forum for climate justice in Cancun in 2010 (Von Vogt, 2010). Here, the International Forum on Climate Justice brought together international civil society organisations, social movements and indigenous groups. Debates, workshops and demonstrations took place alongside the UNFCCC negotiations (ibid.).

A similar alternative summit was held the following year in Durban, in parallel to COP 17. PACJA organised 'The Caravan of Hope', which travelled from Burundi to South Africa, gaining publicity and raising awareness of climate justice along the way (Austin-Evelyn, 2011). Thousands of civil society organisations took part in the 'Global Day of Action' and marched in demand for climate action (ibid.).

The mobilisation around Copenhagen is often viewed as the peak of the climate justice movement. Indeed it was a unique moment in history. Over 100 world leaders attended the conference with 100,000 activists protesting outside. Climate change and climate justice were on the world stage and public awareness had increased to a new level. However, where it was hoped that a legally binding treaty would be forthcoming, the only tangible result was an agreement ‘to take note of’ a text titled the Copenhagen Accord (Khor, 2012). Copenhagen was a huge disappointment for many committed climate justice activists. Some see it as a turning point where a failure to produce a coherent and united set of demands contributed to the failure of the negotiations to reach a binding agreement. 'One of the failings of the big Copenhagen mobilisation, which I think really put climate justice on the map, at least as a slogan, is that we failed to kind of define, give it a sharp enough, strong enough definition' (Bullard, 2013).

After Copenhagen, many activists became disillusioned with the UNFCCC process and the movement retreated somewhat from the global sphere (Mueller and Bullard, 2011). Countries are now focused on negotiating a climate agreement for 2015. Strong climate justice advocacy continues particularly by groups in the South and the movement continues to grow online. The field of climate change now encompasses a 'complex web of disciplines and professions' from grassroots special interest groups to international NGOs to governments all over the world (Cameron, 2010, p.676). Climate change is a global problem involving every person on the planet (Huq, 2013). This research suggests that climate justice has grown and evolved, representing a myriad of groups and their disparate perspectives bound by a common concern with finding a just solution to a problem which affects us all.
4. Perspectives on Climate Justice

Individuals and groups working under the banner of climate justice come from diverse backgrounds and a range of political positions. This diversity is reflected in a number of differing perspectives on climate justice. While some views may appear contradictory, this research finds that all are bound by a common recognition of the injustice inherent in the fact that those least responsible for climate change are most vulnerable to its effects; All are bound by a common desire for climate action and recognition that more must be done.

This research has found evidence of differences in perspective in three main areas. Differences can be seen between the perspectives of those in the North and the perspectives of those in the South. Perspectives further differ on the subject of how far one should adhere to one’s principles and when these can be compromised in order to make progress politically. A third divergence is evident on the subject of the role of carbon markets in tackling climate change and achieving climate justice.

4.1 Perspectives of the North and South
Maps indicating global vulnerability to climate change reveal a clear North-South divide and this difference is reflected in their dissimilar perspectives and narratives on climate change (Mickelson, 2009). In the South, the dominant narrative is very justice-orientated and a concern with equity is paramount. This is unsurprising when understood as a response to the disparities in the distribution of the costs and benefits of climate change.

In their seminal report ‘Global Warming in an Unequal World’, Agarwal and Narain (1991) highlighted the differences in global emissions, distinguishing between ‘luxury’ and ‘survival’ emissions. Influenced by their arguments, Southern countries insisted that this inequality of historical responsibility be recognised in the text of the UNFCCC (1992). This is reflected in the adoption of the principles of equity and ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities’ (CBDR-RC) in Article 3 of the UNFCCC (ibid.). It reflects the concern of Southern nations that differing historical responsibility be recognised. It has also been suggested that it also reflects the unwillingness of the North to assume full responsibility contributing to contested views of the term (Fisher, 2012; Tariq et al., 1995).

While Southern nations are concerned about the effects of climate change on their livelihoods, they are also concerned that restrictions on emissions will be imposed which would negatively affect their ability to develop as countries of the North have done in the past (Kartha, Athanasiou, & Baer, 2012). For them, climate change is inextricably linked to sustainable development and matters of poverty, trade and globalisation (Pettit, 2004). The right to development is disputed and as such is not included in the text of the UNFCCC. Instead, development is recognised as having a key role in the climate change regime (Rajamani, 2010; UNFCCC, 1992).
The elements of equity, CBDR-RC and development remain central to Southern narratives on climate change today. It must be recognised that not all Southern narratives are the same, a reflection of the fact that their circumstances vary hugely. For example, to the Alliance of Small Island States, climate change poses an existential threat as a result of sea-level rise (Mickelson, 2009). In their view, if a tonne of greenhouse gases is emitted, it does not matter if it comes from Bangladesh or from the United States; it is nonetheless a tonne of carbon that will contribute to the demise of their country (Huq, 2012). Conversely, some Southern countries are dependent on fossil fuel extraction for income. Their economies depend on this industry and they ask that consideration of their positions be taken into account when making decisions on implementing restrictions on fossil fuels (Bassey, 2012; Mickelson, 2009). These conflicts in prioritisation are enormously difficult to resolve.

Similarly, not all Northern narratives are the same. The United States has resisted the principle of CBDR from the outset. US negotiator Todd Stern is quoted as saying that although the United States recognises its ‘historic role in putting emissions in the atmosphere’, it ‘categorically rejects... culpability or reparations’ (Lohmann, 2012, p.301). The US perspective is further illustrated in the academic writing of Posner and Weisbach (2010). They have stated ‘it is not possible to defend an approach that requires wealthy nations to scale back their emissions while requiring poor nations to do little or nothing’ (ibid., p.190). Views such as these have led to accusations that ‘the West is trying to use climate change to constrain the growth of China and other developing countries’ (Wen, 2012, p. 126).

However, not all countries of the North share this view. The European Union appears more open to taking climate action than the US. For example, while the US did not sign up to the Kyoto Protocol and its emission reduction targets, the EU not only signed up to it but also had a hand in extending the period of the Protocol and further emission reduction targets (Khor, 2012).

There is an accepted understanding that with regard to climate change, the Northern countries are not justice-orientated. Willis (2013) believes that people in the North require a better understanding of climate justice in order to adopt it into their own narratives. Similarly, Huq (2013) recognises a need for increased use of a climate justice narrative in the North.

‘Diametrically opposed perceptions of ‘climate justice’ among rich and poor nations... pose a serious threat to political resolution and pollute a diplomatic atmosphere already teetering on the edge of disaster’ (Roberts & Parks, 2007, p.4). Kartha et al. (2012) have suggested that a period of trust-building is required to overcome the impasse between North and South.

The old dichotomy of developed and developing nations has changed. A third group of ‘emerging economies’ has formed from within the group of developing nations. Brazil, South Africa, India and China have formed a sub-group called BASIC (Huq, 2012). The traditional North versus South, developed versus developing, rich versus poor dichotomy has evolved. This new dynamic reflects the changing global world, one which has altered significantly since the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992.
The tripartite between North, South and BASIC countries is in fact more complex still. Formerly, inequalities were recognised between countries, particularly between countries of the North and those of the South. However, it is increasingly recognised that there are significant inequalities present not only between countries but within countries also (Mickelson, 2009). In the North as well as the South, there are countries in which elites are reaping the benefits of high energy consuming lifestyles, while low-consuming, vulnerable groups are suffering the consequences (Huq and Toulmin, 2006). For example, India is often criticised because while 500 million people do not have access to electricity, elites are ‘indulging in profligate consumption’ and hiding behind the poor by quoting per capita emission rates (Bidwai, 2012, p.152).

Climate change is a global problem, affecting every country. It creates an inter-dependence that changes the usual power relations. No longer is it simply the South dependent on the North, there is a new interdependence which requires global co-operation and these complex dynamics must be considered if climate justice is to prevail (Goodman, 2012).

4.2 Principles v Pragmatism

Content analysis of interviews and literature suggest that there is a disconnect between the individuals and groups who see the global climate response from an ethical point of view, and those who view it in pragmatic terms (Mickelson, 2009; Raworth, 2013). Those taking an ethical or principled view of the problem often have an anti-authoritarian and anti-state perspective (Long, Roberts, & Dehm, 2010). For them, climate justice has a transformational meaning and to compromise on principle would mean sacrificing this transformational potential. They see climate justice as a struggle for radical system change and transformational global politics and so it requires ‘sticking to the principle in the face of what is politically feasible’ (ibid.). By conceding too early you could do a ‘real disservice to what could be a transformative movement’ (Wu, 2013). Wu’s is not the only voice speaking out in favour of using climate change as an opportunity for transformation. Njamnshi (2013) asks ‘do we abandon our rights or ideology because we want to please?’ Those who support the ideological view propose to radically change global politics in order to address the problems of climate change.

Others take a pragmatic or technocratic perspective and are prepared to engage with the State. They compromise on principles in order to achieve consensus and make progress. Raworth (2013) describes this approach as ‘more strategic than principled’. This does not mean that the pragmatists have no principles; it merely means that they want to see progress being made and if necessary, are prepared to compromise on their principles to do this.

Both groups, pragmatists and idealists, have the same aim: to bring justice to those suffering the effects of climate change. Willis (2013) suggests that ‘to overcome the supposed polarity of fundamental justice versus technocratic transformation’, we must ‘bring these elements together without eliminating what is positive about both of them’.
Perspectives differ concerning the mechanisms available or necessary for achieving climate justice. Not all groups believe that the UNFCCC is the correct forum in which to achieve climate justice. Pragmatic groups are willing to engage with the UNFCCC process in the absence of an alternative forum. Hallstrom (2012, p.8) writes ‘it is hard to imagine a forum other than the UN that could provide space for any kind of multilateral, fair and binding conversation about how this should be done’. From a radical point of view, system change is impossible through institutional means. This lack of belief in the ability of the UNFCCC to bring about climate justice is not just confined to ideologists, but is also supported by many groups at grassroots level. For example, research by Building Bridges Collective (2010) reports that the majority of respondents at the Cochabamba conference did not believe the UNFCCC and COP processes would bring about climate justice. These beliefs largely stem from problems of participation within the UNFCCC and views that these institutions further the interests of large corporations.

4.3 The Role of Carbon Markets

The UNFCCC was instrumental in developing targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and took effect in 2005. It binds certain developed nations to greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. It introduces three market mechanisms which parties can use to ensure they meet their commitments: International Emissions Trading (IET), Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI) (UN, 1997). These three instruments form part of the carbon market and allow for emissions trading between countries (ibid.).

Perspectives on the role of carbon markets differ hugely. Certain climate justice groups reject these as ‘false solutions’ to climate change and a method for countries of the North to buy their way out of emission reductions (CorpWatch, 1999). Tom Goldtooth, of the Indigenous Environmental Network, describes these solutions as ‘greenwashing policies’, which allow fossil fuel extraction to continue unabated (Rising Tide North America & Carbon Trade Watch, 2009, p. 28). These market mechanisms are criticised for causing the commodification of carbon and have been described as ‘carbon colonialism’ and a state-driven excuse for further accumulation (Roberts & Parks, 2009, p. 399). The situation surrounding greenhouse gas emissions is not the only area of contention in the search for solutions to climate change.

Some groups condemn ‘techno-fixes’ including nuclear power, clean coal and carbon capture, geo-engineering, natural gas, biomass, agrofuels, hydroelectric dams, cloud whitening, plastic coated deserts and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) among others (Building Bridges Collective, 2010). They believe that these technological solutions have not been properly investigated in order to establish confidently that they are not adding to the problem (Rising Tide North America & Carbon Trade Watch, 2009).

REDD is a particularly controversial UN mitigation scheme. This scheme was intended to prevent deforestation and forest degradation through payments from developed countries to poorer nations as an incentive to protect their forests (Rising Tide North America & Carbon Trade Watch, 2009). It
has been described as a ‘wedge issue’ within the climate justice community (Bond & Dorsey, 2010, p.10). At the Cochabamba Conference there was much debate over this scheme. Ultimately, after much deliberation, the forests working group agreed to oppose the ‘neoliberal market mechanism such as the REDD mechanism’, stating that it is ‘violating the rights, uses, and customs of the Peoples and the Rights of Nature’ (Building Bridges Collective, 2010, p. 44). This illustrates the disparity between the mechanisms adopted by the UNFCCC and COP processes and the views of certain civil society groups and social movements.

Anti-capitalist groups condemn NGOs and other organisations that support market based solutions. Instead, they advocate for responses to the climate crisis that are community-led. They call for ‘localised, community sovereignty over food, energy, and other resources’ (Long, Roberts, & Dehm, 2010, p.3). It would seem that there is a gulf between the perceptions of what constitutes acceptable solutions by more radical groups and those implemented by the UNFCCC.
5. Approaches to Climate Justice Action

The large numbers of people and organisations from every country, with different views and beliefs, have different approaches to achieving climate justice. These approaches contain common elements. In 2002, Athanasiou and Baer (cited in Evans, 2010) divided climate justice campaigns into four themes. This research project suggests that these divisions still hold true and action on climate justice can be categorised into four areas; causes of climate change, rights of affected communities, reparations to repay the climate debt, and promoting participatory democracy (ibid., p.203).

These areas overlap and are interconnected in both theory and practice. Being involved in one area, does not rule out involvement in the other three. Some groups work in all four, while others concentrate on one alone. For example, a development NGO who has been working with local communities on sustainable development might be concerned with the rights of the community and ensuring that their voices are heard, whereas an environmental NGO might concentrate solely on pushing ambitious emission reduction targets, working to eliminate the causes of climate change.

5.1 Causes of Climate Change

There is agreement, as set out in the UNFCCC, that those with greatest historical responsibility for emissions and greatest capability to adapt should be the first to cut their emissions. Some climate justice actors focus on this area, and concentrate their efforts on combatting the causes of climate change. Such actors call on developed countries to commit to ambitious emission reduction targets to enable others to have the opportunity to achieve prosperity, believing that this is an equitable solution to the problem (Rosemberg, 2013). However, implementing these policies in a practical way has led to differences of opinion. Questions around how to allocate emission quotas and how to distribute the ‘mitigation burden’ have led to the development of a number of different emission reduction/allocation proposals (Meyer & Roser, 2010). These include Contraction and Convergence, Greenhouse Development Rights, and Cap and Trade.

While these proposals have been made at an inter-governmental level, many other organisations are working on tackling the causes of climate change at local and national levels. For example, the group 350.org uses grassroots organising, mass public actions and online campaigns to spread the message that ‘to preserve our planet, scientists tell us we must reduce the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere from its current levels of nearly 400 parts per million to below 350 ppm. But 350 is more than a number—it’s a symbol of where we need to head as a planet.’ They call on people to hold ‘leaders accountable to realities of science and principles of justice’ (350.org, 2007). Another proposed approach has coined the phrase ‘Keeping the oil in the soil, the coal in the hole and the tar sands in the land’ (popularised by Oilwatch campaign cited in Bassey, 2012, p.334). Certain economies (e.g. Ecuador) depend on income from fossil fuel extraction and this strategy suggests that developed countries should pay to keep fossil fuels from being extracted, thereby compensating countries for lost revenue.
5.2 Rights of Affected Communities

The second area of climate justice action relates to ensuring the rights of vulnerable groups and communities. This protectionist approach is adopted by actors in an attempt to ensure that the poor and disempowered people of the world have the right to develop and have decent livelihoods. This element of climate justice is concerned with supporting the least responsible, and yet often the most affected individuals. These actors ensure the provision of interventions to help communities cope with the impacts of climate change, improving their chances of survival and their ability to live fulfilling lives.

This approach is not just confined to NGOs working with the world’s most vulnerable populations. For labour unions, the protectionist approach means supporting workers who risk losing their jobs in a transition to a new low carbon society (Rosemberg, 2013). This approach will have increasingly more validity as industries adjust to less carbon intensive forms of production.

There is recognition that certain subgroups are more vulnerable than others to climate change. The reasons for vulnerability are many and varied depending on the particular group, their location, livelihood, gender, education and culture. These include women, children, the elderly, the disabled, and indigenous groups (Mwenda, 2013). Their heightened vulnerability to climate risks is due to factors including their location, their livelihoods (e.g. weather dependent farming) and their access to resources (e.g. money, assets etc.) to mitigate risk (Adger et al., 2004). It is not just the most vulnerable people of the world today that climate justice actors must consider; they must also be cognisant of future generations (Rigg, 2013).

Future generations are especially vulnerable to our response to climate change. They will not have contributed to the problem but will be affected. Rigg (2013) believes that future generations are often left out of climate justice debates. For YOUNGO, the official youth constituency of UNFCCC however, intergenerational justice is a common climate justice narrative (International Youth Climate Movement, 2010).

Sometimes the rights of one group impinge on the rights of another. For instance, Rajamani (2010, p.416) outlines an example: ‘in India where 44% of its population (approximately 500 million) does not have access to electricity, provision of energy to all will result in rapid increases in GHGs. Such increases could result, directly or indirectly, in the loss of the island of Tuvalu.’ The rights of 500 million Indians to development and access to energy would cause an increase in carbon emissions which would have subsequent significant negative impacts on the people of Tuvalu and their rights.

5.3 Reparations for Historic Climate Debt

This strand of the climate justice narrative centres on a liability approach and the idea that if the actions of one group injure another and that group suffers a loss, then compensation should be provided to the injured party. Climate debt is understood to be the combined emissions debt and adaptation debt which developed nations owe to developing nations (Stilwell, 2012). It is the idea
that victims must be compensated by those who have benefited in an attempt to equalise the disparities of climate change.

The repayment of climate debt is a major aspect of civil society campaigns for climate justice. Njamnshi (2013) of PACJA believes ‘climate debt is the key to climate justice. Whosoever is talking about climate justice without talking about climate debt, is not doing a lot of justice’. Compensation can take many forms and is not purely financial. It is about supporting people to improve their livelihoods and develop sustainably (Muffuh, 2013). It can include the provision of technologies to help with adaptation as well as efforts to build capacity. The Building Bridges Collective (2010) reports that more radical groups view the financial demands of compensation as a tool, rather than a realistic demand. They argue that ‘climate debt is a political issue, and cannot be reduced to a simple financial transaction’ (Building Bridges Collective, 2010, p. 28). They demand the removal of patents on technologies as payment and believe that the term ‘climate debt’ is a useful reminder of the responsibility of the North in this climate crisis. Again, differences in perspective are evident within the one approach.

5.4 Promoting Participatory Democracy

Giving voice to vulnerable populations is another essential element of climate justice action. Climate justice groups all over the world are concerned with promoting participatory democracy for vulnerable populations. For example, climate change affects men and women differently. For women, the burden is often greater. Feminists groups have used the campaign slogan ‘No climate justice without gender justice’, to highlight that there can be no climate justice without listening to the voices of women (Terry, 2009, p.15). Terry (ibid.) remarks that gender issues are not considered in the texts of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. Some climate justice actors attempt to tackle these issues by focusing their efforts on encouraging the involvement of women in decision making on climate change (Kibe, 2013).

Similarly, a recent UN General Assembly (2012) note by the Secretary General on the human rights of migrants draws attention to the absence of a voice of climate-change-induced migrants. Fisher (2012) blames the international scale of the climate justice debate for the exclusion of vulnerable communities.

Problems of equal participation of countries are also recognised within the UNFCCC. Research by Hulbert (2011) on COP 15 found that a large proportion of respondents who had taken part in the negotiations did not feel that their country had contributed adequately to the outcome. Huq (2013) describes the UNFCCC as ‘an unequal playing field’. On behalf of the International Institute for Environment and Development, Huq works to support negotiators from Least Developed Countries improve their ability to negotiate in the UN process. Also involved in this task is the Third World Network and elements of CJN! They work to assist developing country parties and encourage them to work together in an effort to balance the unequal power dynamics at play in the climate regime (Long, Roberts, & Dehm, 2010).
6. Who was using a Climate Justice Narrative at end of December 2011?

Content analysis of interview transcriptions shows that when asked ‘Who are the users of a climate justice narrative?’ the answer was consistently ‘civil society’. Gore’s (2013) response is indicative of the overall findings: ‘it is primarily civil society rather than governments. It is primarily civil society in the South rather than in the North’.

Among countries, Bolivia stood out as a user of the climate justice narrative, while within the UNFCCC process, the term was found to be used infrequently. This research found that there are a small number of world leaders who have used their high profile in an effort to draw attention to and advocate for climate justice. In contrast, no private sector organisations were found to use a climate justice narrative.

6.1 Civil Society

Civil society plays a very important role in advocating for climate justice. Civil society groups take many forms and employ multiple tactics to achieve their aims ‘from lobbying to campaigning through to sabotage and direct actions, and everything in between’ (Building Bridges Collective, 2010, p. 27). Some organisations focus solely on climate justice while others work on broader issues including climate change, social development and human rights. While many climate justice groups focus primarily on movement-building, others take an alternative top-down approach, interacting at levels of global governance.

Climate justice encompasses an ‘intricate web of grassroots initiatives from diverse regions’ (Chawla, 2009, p.119). They work with NGOs who integrate their principles and ideas into proposals and submissions made to the UNFCCC (Chawla, 2009). Certain groups integrate climate justice with their own concerns. For example, La ViaCampesina has used the climate justice frame in reference to debates about food production (Bullard, 2013).

Indigenous people’s organisations have played an important role in promoting climate justice. Theirs is a more holistic and systemic view of nature and the rights of mother earth in the climate justice debate (Bullard, 2013). Faith based groups are also active in the climate justice community. Their notion of stewardship and the role of human beings in protecting each other and protecting the planet resonates well with the concept of climate justice as does their focus on equity and fairness (Lutes, 2013; Muffuh, 2013).

Labour unions engage with the concept of climate justice. They have developed the concept of ‘Just Transition’, to support workers and communities who are affected by climate change in the move to a low carbon economy (Rosemberg, 2013). For example, Britain’s Trade Union Congress outlines their Just Transition principles, which consider issues of environment, employment and government support.
6.2 Countries
Of the 195 countries party to the UNFCCC, Bolivia was the only country regularly cited in the
interviews as using the climate justice narrative. Bolivia is particularly vulnerable to climate change.
Some studies have suggested that within 30 years the capital city of La Paz could become a desert
(Solón, 2012). It has adopted a radical approach to the need to address climate change and has
become a beacon and leader in the climate justice narrative.

Bolivia’s approach to climate change and climate justice is informed by the Cochabamba
Conference and discourse on the Rights of Mother Earth, which is considered to derive from the
world view of a variety of indigenous peoples (Sharkey, 2013). Sharkey suggests that the Bolivian
contribution has played an extremely important role in advocating deeper consideration of
humanity’s interaction with the natural environment. By creating a space for civil society and
different parts of the climate justice movement to come together at Cochabamba, the country has
‘played a tremendously important role’ (Bullard, 2013). These events influenced the climate justice
narrative and challenged the discourse.

Also associated with this narrative are the countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas
(ALBA) group, of which Bolivia is a member. They propose an ‘alternative to the neoliberal model’
which promotes capital accumulation by elite minorities. They take a radical position, looking for a
complete system change. Within the UNFCCC, the ALBA nations have blocking power as the process
is based on consensus but their views are not shared by many (Rajamani, 2010). Bolivia took a strong
position at COP 15, opposing the Copenhagen Accord. At COP 16, in Cancun, Bolivia was alone in
opposing the Cancun Agreements (Solón, 2012). Describing Bolivia’s decision to stand up and oppose
these accords, Solón (2012, p.108) writes ‘to remain silent is to be complicit in genocide and
ecocide’.

6.3 UNFCCC Process
Throughout the interviews conducted for this research, there appeared to be a sense that states
were reticent to use the term ‘climate justice’, because it was ‘politically loaded’ and ‘taboo’. There
was general consensus that the UNFCCC, an inter-governmental process, was not the forum for
discussing climate justice.

Huq (2013) explained that the consensus-driven nature of the UNFCCC process means that it is
difficult to address justice. Banuri (2013) stated that ‘there is a tremendous apprehension on the
part of developed countries about any formula that leans toward climate justice. On the other hand,
there is tremendous apprehension on the part of developing countries of any formula that ignores
or bypasses it’. He believes that there is a lack of trust between developed and developing nations
which has contributed to the ‘paralysis’ in the UNFCCC for the last 20 years.

It was suggested that one reason for this is that climate justice draws on the idea of culpability and
that ‘if you talk about justice, there is a big price tag’ (Anonymous Negotiator, 2013). It was stated
that while many countries might agree with the concept of climate justice, they would not use the
term itself explicitly in the UNFCCC process. ‘Climate justice is not in the vocabulary of the delegates here’ (van Ypersele, 2013). Rather, the application of the principles of equity and CBDR-RC can be seen as a route to achieving justice.

6.3.1 COP 16 Review
All 183 statements available on the UNFCCC website for COP 16 were searched for reference to climate justice.

Country Statements
Of 158 country statements, only one mentioned climate justice. Nicaragua’s statement reads ‘Again, as a people, impoverished by the unjust and sinful system we want to transform, we have the duty to support all initiatives to ensure that we seek environmental justice and climate justice for Mother Earth and humanity’.

International Organisation Statements
Of 14 statements by international organisations, none mentioned climate justice.

Non-Governmental Organisation Statements
Out of 11 statements by NGOs only the statement by the World Council of Churches on behalf of faith based NGOs referred to climate justice. It stated ‘We cannot afford another failure. Now it is the time for climate justice and to reach a brave, fair and binding agreement’.

6.3.2 COP 17 Review
All 181 statements available on the UNFCCC website for COP 17 were searched for reference to climate justice.

Country Statements
Of 163 country statements, only three countries referred to climate justice in their submissions to COP 17: Ireland, Ecuador and Paraguay. Ireland’s statement read ‘there is a compelling case for Climate Justice,’ while Ecuador’s stated ‘for us, it is essential to continue our fight for climate justice’. Paraguay’s statement mentioned a social and environmental debt which has ‘lead to climatic injustice’. The Paraguayan statement continued, commenting on ‘assuring justice in the development of people’ and stating ‘the commitments of Durban must be exemplary towards the reestablishment of climate balance and justice’.

International Organisation Statements
Of the 14 statements made by international organisations, none referred to climate justice.

NGO Statements
The strongest incantation of climate justice came from the statement of the World Council of Churches. It refers to a statement issued at COP 12, five years before, in which the Faith Communities demanded ‘Climate Justice for All!’ At that time, they wrote ‘Faith Communities are
addressing climate change because it is a spiritual and ethical issue of justice, equity, solidarity, sufficiency and sustainability’. After five years, they ask, ‘Where is justice?’ Towards the end of their statement, they proclaim ‘Act now for climate justice!’ and mention justice again in two quotes from the bible. Out of a total of 11 statements made by NGOs, this was the only one to reference climate justice.

6.4 World Leaders

This research project has identified only a small number of world leaders as referring to climate justice up to the end of 2011. The Kofi Annan Foundation website provides information on the many occasions in which Mr. Annan has called for climate justice. In addition, his organisation ‘Global Humanitarian Forum’, as a member of the Global Call for Climate Action (GCCA) forum, was instrumental in the creation of the ‘TckTckTck’ campaign which was active in the run up to COP 15 in Copenhagen.

Through her organisations Realizing Rights and the Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice, Mary Robinson has made climate justice a central focus of her work in recent years.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu has been active in the field of climate change, calling for climate justice. He was involved in the ‘TckTckTck’ campaign and is a member of 350.org.

Former President of the Maldives, Mohammad Nasheedi’s active in his quest for climate justice. He made a documentary (’The Island President’) about his quest for climate justice and search for help for his country at the time of COP15. He established the Climate Vulnerable Forum in 2009, a grouping of countries especially vulnerable to climate change; and the Climate Vulnerability Monitor in 2010, a new global report on climate vulnerability.

Bolivian President Evo Morales has used the climate justice narrative. As previously mentioned, he called the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, which has been described as a ‘significant step in the maturation of the [climate justice] movement’ (Long, Roberts & Dehm, 2010, p.12). President Morales is an active advocate for climate justice.

Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond has also been identified as using a climate justice narrative. In China in December 2011, he gave a speech in which he discussed ‘the overwhelming case for climate justice’ (Scottish Government, 2011).

6.5 Private Sector

This research has found no evidence of the use of a climate justice narrative by the private sector, either in the course of the interviews or in the literature reviews.
6.6 General Public

It is beyond the scope of this project to investigate the use of the term ‘climate justice’ by the general public. However, recent research by Oxfam (unpublished) suggests that members of the general public have little or no understanding of the concept of climate justice. When pressed for an explanation, respondents in focus groups across countries were likely to explain it in terms of ‘nature taking revenge’ on human beings, an understanding that is entirely different from that of organised civil society (Gore, 2013).
7. Baseline

The baseline shows that at the end of December 2011:

- Climate justice was predominantly used by civil society, who adopt various different perspectives and approaches,
- Climate justice was used infrequently by countries, primarily by ALBA countries and particularly by Bolivia,
- Within the UNFCCC process, climate justice is seen as somewhat of a taboo. It was referenced in only two COP 16 statements and four COP 17 statements,
- Less than ten world leaders were identified as using climate justice,
- No private sector organisations were found to use a climate justice narrative.

Any future research on the use of a climate justice narrative can be measured against this baseline.
8. References


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UNDP. (2007). *The Other Half of Climate Change: Why Indonesia Must Adapt to Protect its Poorest People.* Jakarta: UNDP.


### Appendices

#### Appendix 1: List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>In person/telephone</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Alber, Gotelind</td>
<td>Gender CC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Athanasiou, Tom</td>
<td>Eco Equity</td>
<td>By telephone</td>
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<td>Banuri, Tariq</td>
<td>DESA</td>
<td>By telephone</td>
<td>14.6.13</td>
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<td>Bullard, Nicola</td>
<td>Focus on Global South</td>
<td>By telephone</td>
<td>18.6.13</td>
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<td>Dorsey, Michael</td>
<td>Dartmouth University</td>
<td>By telephone</td>
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<td>Gore, Tim</td>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>By telephone</td>
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<td>Hmaidin, Wael</td>
<td>CAN</td>
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<td>Humphreys, Stephen</td>
<td>LSE</td>
<td>By telephone</td>
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<td>Huq, Saleemul</td>
<td>IIED</td>
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<td>SEI-US</td>
<td>In person</td>
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<td>Kruse, Tom</td>
<td>Rockefeller</td>
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<td>WWF</td>
<td>In person</td>
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<td>Massawa, Emily</td>
<td>UNEP Kenya</td>
<td>By telephone</td>
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<td>Muffuh, Nelson</td>
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<td>Sharkey, Cliona*</td>
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<td>Toni, Ana</td>
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<td>Willis, John</td>
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<td>van Ypersele, Jean-Pascal</td>
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<td>Yamin, Farhana*</td>
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*Informal scoping interviews

Informal interviews were also conducted with three negotiators who wished to remain anonymous.
Appendix 2: List of those contacted but who were unavailable

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Appendix 3: List of interview questions

1. What is your understanding of climate justice?
2. What are the essential elements of a climate justice narrative?
3. What are the origins of climate justice and how has it evolved?
4. A climate justice narrative seemed to be prominent around the time of COP15 in Copenhagen. Was there a time before or since that climate justice was high on the agenda?
5. Do you think climate justice has influenced climate policy to date?
6. Who are the key stakeholders using a climate justice narrative?
7. Do you think these stakeholders use different interpretations of climate justice?
Endnotes

1 Including Focus on the Global South, the International Forum on Globalisation, the World Development Movement, Via Campesina, Friends of the Earth, Third World Network, Jubilee 2000.

2 CorpWatch had been active in the environmental justice movement.

3 Reference to mechanisms established in the Kyoto Protocol; International Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism (UN, 1997)

4 Negotiated between 1990 and 1992, the UNFCCC is an international treaty whose objective is to ‘stabilise greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ (UN, 1992). The UNFCCC’s main institution is the annual Conference of the Parties (COP), a meeting of the parties to the Convention at which they assess progress in tackling climate change.


7 This declaration built on The Bali Principles of Climate Justice and the 10 Principles for Just Climate Policies in the US, which themselves were built on the 1991 Principles of Environmental Justice (Roberts and Parks, 2009, p.395).

8 The link between human rights and climate change has been well documented (Cameron, 2010; Cournil, et al., 2012; ICHR, 2008; Rajamani, 2010).

9 17 major development and humanitarian aid organisations in Europe which work closely together with the World Council for Churches www.aprodev.eu

10 The ALBA group also includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Saint Lucia and Venezuela.

11 COP 16 statements are available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/5777.php

12 The following COP16 statements are listed as ‘not available’ on the UNFCCC website: France, Kiribati, Bolivia, Niue, Australia on behalf of Umbrella Group, Ethiopia on behalf of the African Group.

13 COP 17 statements are available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/durban_nov_2011/statements/items/6584.php

14 The following COP 17 statements are listed as ‘not available’ UNFCCC website: Chile, Sudan, Switzerland, USA.

15 This report defines world leaders as including the following: former and current heads of state; leaders of international or multilateral organisations, institutions or processes; people with international influence.